ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: May the difficulties of Alfred Marshall's theory of justice be resolved?
Author: MARTINOIA Rozenn
May the difficulties of Alfred Marshall's theory of justice be resolved? Alfred Marshall is considered by scholars as evaluating alternative social states according to their outcomes on the greatest welfare of the greatest number. In previous works , I have re-appraised this interpretation by pointing out Marshall's bi-dimensional conception of good: marshallian welfare is composed of both economic welfare and moral welfare. The purpose of my proposal to the conference is to study the consistency of Marshall' theory of justice on the basis of these two dimensions which, until now, I have only studied separately. On the one hand, in Marshall's thought economic welfare refers to satisfactions indirectly measured by money. Social valuations of economic welfare are made with respect to the best-judge principle, within a welfarist perspective. Therefore, Marshall's conception of economic welfare may be related to Utilitarian Philosophy. However, on the other hand, Marshall's normative conception of moral welfare as noble satisfactions representative of the Victorian moral values rather relates his thought to Perfectionist Philosophy. Consequently, this bi-dimensional conception of good is problematic. If economic welfare and moral welfare are two heterogeneous and incommensurable dimensions of good, then the principle of justice which underlies public decision is inoperative. However, the existence of a lexicographic ordering of theses dimensions of good might open a solution. Mary Paley Marshall , recalling in her memories the supremacy of moral welfare in Marshall's lectures to women, suggests such an idea. My purpose is to follow this assumption within an historical perspective; considering both early and mature works, published and unpublished writings.
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