ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: What do economists mean by normative judgment?
Author: SU Huei-Chun
It is generally accepted by most economists that ‘positive’ economics should not involve value judgments. In the past half century or so, eliminating value judgments from positive economics has been considered as a norm of the practice of the discipline. Behind the practice of preventing value judgment from positive economics actually lies an implicit assumption that positive economics can be value free and hence scientific. This view is commonly accepted, but not without controversy. For instance, in his illuminating article ‘Economists, Values, and Ideology: a Neglected Agenda’ (2005), Roger Backhouse refined the concept of value judgment by highlighting the distinction between ‘intellectual’ and ‘social and political’ value judgments, and argued that in spite of the attention to the influence of economists values on their work, ‘the values on which attention was focused were primarily social and political rather than intellectual’ and ‘the ideological implications of economists intellectual values have not been thoroughly explored’. Backhouse, therefore, suggests that ‘the relationship between economists intellectual values and ideology presents an important but neglected agenda’. Indeed, even if it is possible to avoid social or political value judgement in economic studies, it is arguable whether it is possible to achieve ideological neutrality, since bias may come in through theory or method choice. This paper considers that Backhouse’s distinction of ‘intellectual’ and ‘political’ value judgments plays an important role in advancing the study of the link between ideology and economics. In particular, this paper would like to respond the call in Backhouse’s article that the clarification of the term ‘value judgments’ is needed for it has been used in an inconsistent way by different economists, and even economic methodologists. In addition to the concept of ‘value judgments’, this paper will examine the concept of ‘normative judgments’. However, this paper does not intend to deal with ‘the neglected agenda’ pointed out by Backhouse. Instead, it is attempted as a preliminary analysis of the relationship between economics and ‘moral’ value or normative judgements. The paper will first examine the difference in the use of the term of value judgment and normative judgement by different economists and economic texts. This paper will differentiate the use of the term by focusing on whether it contains moral connotations or not. In other words, in contrast to Backhouse’s distinction of ‘intellectual’ and ‘political’ value judgment, this paper emphasizes the distinction between moral and non-moral normative judgements. Based on this classification, the paper intends to show that non-moral normative judgments are pervasive in such branches of economics as public economics, public finance, labour economics, environmental economics, and so on, and to demonstrate that logical reasoning are applicable to non-moral normative arguments. As to the moral normative judgments, the paper argues that they can be and should be subject to logical reasoning, and that the recognition of the possibility of rational and logical moral normative judgments is essential for improving the quality of the economic policy decision making process.
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