ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: How market ideology absorbed Cold War planning and concentration: Chicago school economics and the changing face of intellectual property rights
Author: Klaes Matthias, van Horn Rob


This paper will explore how the figure of the market and of competition resonated in the discipline of economics and its wider intellectual and political context during the Cold War, by tracing the changing attitudes of Chicago economists to intellectual property rights from the immediate post-war era to the late 1970s. In the year following the Second World War, classical liberal economists at Chicago felt threatened by what they perceived as a prevailing anti-market attitude. Determined to prevent the demise of their liberal tradition, they joined forces with a wider movement, the Mont Pelerin Society, and sought to reformulate this tradition to become what entered the political consciousness as the neoliberal project. We will argue that the Chicago School’s effort to reformulate classical liberalism eventually led to a reconstitution of aspects of the liberal doctrine; thus, Chicago neoliberal positions regarding industrial monopoly, restrictive trading practices, and patents and copyright emerged. For example, the Chicago School abandoned the anti-patent attitude prevalent in the classical liberal tradition and adopted a pro-patent, neoliberal position. Even though this reformulation effort started in the immediate post war period, because it continued through the 1950s, it took place in response to a rejection of the beneficial influence of market forces from other intellectual quarters in the U.S. Chicago economists not only embraced market imperfections, such as patents and copyright, they also argued for the desirable nature of these imperfections on the grounds of price theory, and in doing so, they opposed economic studies issued by Cold War think tanks, such as the RAND Corporation, which came close to arguing in favour of the superiority of central planning in order to counter the Communist threat. The technocratic argument, most prominently represented by Kenneth Arrow and closely associated with a tradition of economic analysis heavily indebted to operations research, lost out to the Chicago neo-liberal argument, most notably represented by Ronald Coase. Arrow, prompted by policy concerns regarding the capability of the U.S. to keep up with the Soviet Union in the unfolding arms race, turned his attention to the question of whether a market system, where allocation of talent would follow market incentives and not necessarily national security concerns, would produce a shortage of talent in science and engineering. He identified a range of market failures in the context of R&D, which suggested the superiority of planned allocation of R&D efforts in some contexts. Coase, on the other hand, promoted an unwavering support for R&D allocation through market mechanisms and suggested, contrary to Arrow, that patents played an indispensable role in the creation and definition of property rights for the market mechanism to properly function. Arrow’s arguments helped to consolidate the new field of the economics of information, which, because of its emphasis on market failure, created a predicament for the economic mainstream. The predicament resulted from the tension of having to challenge the ideological position of the Cold War opponent while suggesting the importance of economic planning to correct the market failures in the context of R&D. Coase and others at Chicago, on the other hand, had arrived at a different perspective on market imperfections. They argued that as long as the economic system could be regarded as broadly competitive, such 'imperfections' would not warrant planned intervention at all. Thus, by not conceding the superiority of the rationale of economic planning in the face of prima facie market imperfections in the context of R&D and by championing a pro-patent position, Chicago neoliberals were able to leave behind the high Cold War economics emanating from the technocratic operations research tradition.

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