ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The Economics of Paradigm Change
Author: Heukelom Floris, Maseland Robbert
Economists have been interested in science for three reasons: as a driver of technology and thus as a driver of economic growth (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942, Landes, 1998, Romer, 1986, 1990); as a producer of knowledge and information (e.g. Goldman and Shaked, 1991, Brock and Durlauf, 1999, Stiglitz?); and as supplying to and demanding from a marketplace of ideas (e.g. Blank and Stigler, 1957, Biddle and Roberts, 1994 see for overviews of the economics of science literature e.g. Diamond, 2008, Sent, 1999). Curiously enough, the internal dynamics of science has remained unexamined. This paper is a first attempt to fill that void for the case of economics. We analyse the process of scientific evolution in two steps. First, we develop a simple theoretical model to analyse the mechanisms behind specialisation and changes in the content of ‘mainstream economics’. Second, we apply the insights from this model to explain mainstream responses to new ideas, and more specifically why some ‘outsider’ authors and movements have made it into the mainstream while others have not. Our theoretical argument is based on a simple Heckscher-Ohlin type framework, in which there is a tenured elite and a group of outsiders competing for the elites’ tenured positions. Both produce human capital intensive and social capital intensive knowledge that they sell on ‘the marketplace for ideas’. Social capital includes all skills, knowledge and network the scientist may use to advance his or her career other than her purely cognitive and technical skills. Tenure is received on basis of the ‘market value’ of produced publications. We argue that tenure comes with an insiders’ bonus in the form of extra social capital, so that elites enjoy higher amounts of social capital than outsiders. It follows that only those outsiders are able to get tenure whose human capital is high or special enough to compensate for their relative lack of social capital. By exploiting their comparative advantage in human-capital intensive publications, only the most human capital-abundant outsiders replace part of the existing elite. In response to this competition from outsiders specialising in human capital intensive knowledge, existing tenured elites specialise in social capital intensive publications. We conclude that (1) only outsiders with a comparative advantage in human capital intensive knowledge are able to enter the mainstream; (2) in the face of new movements, existing elites will respond by specialising in social capital intensive production. In the second part of this paper, we apply this model to the stylized career paths of Joseph Stiglitz, Daniel Kahneman, and Thorstein Veblen. We argue that Stiglitz, in the wake of the new plurality of economic sub-disciplines, rationally chose to focus on the production of the type of knowledge in which he held a comparative advantage: broad, social capital-intensive books and policy advise. Kahneman, by contrast, as an outsider invested heavily in the human capital knowledge with which he could enter the elite. Veblen, lastly, sought to enter the elite but, contrary to the rationality of our model, did so by investing in his social capital knowledge. It follows from our model that Veblen was hence doomed to fail. We conclude that our model is able to explain some of the evolution of economic thought, and argue for a wider application of economic analysis to the field.
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