ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Theory as practice: the economic psychology of Simon and Schelling
Author: Koumakhov Rouslan


Simon and Schelling had a common project: to justify that coordination and cooperation problems cannot be examined independently from psychology. Furthermore, the psychological dimension they appeal to relies on empirically-based foundations, incompatible with the basic assumptions of the neoclassical economics and the standard game theory. The main point is that studying those coordination/cooperation problems (essentially in the context of organizations by Simon or within the game-theoretical framework by Schelling) was deeply rooted into the practical work. Simon’s pro-active involvement into the 50-60s cognitive revolution, especially his empirical psychological investigations at Carnegie, with corresponding study of beliefs and mental processes (whether applied to organization sciences or not) directly shaped his bounded rationality paradigm in general and behavioral approach to economics in particular. Similarly, drawing on informal experimental work and adopting an interdisciplinary viewpoint, Schelling appeals to the real-life reasoning of the real-world people and, therefore, views game theory as a priori empirically founded theory. Moreover, it is argued, Schelling’s main methodological concern was not only about utilizing more experimental methods, but about a complete reorientation of the game theory on the basis of social psychology. The consequence of reconstructing Simon’s and Schelling’s research agenda from that perspective is two-fold. In the first instance, both approaches provide solutions to coordination problems, which are psychologically reliable, while those problems remain intractable for rational individuals/players within the standard game theory or neoclassical economics. In the second instance, by applying their psychological frameworks to the concepts of organizational/social roles, customs and institutions, Simon and Schelling readdress the problem of behavioral choice as a problem of both mental states and morality. This last point is directly related to Simon’s fundamental idea of the two-phase decision mechanism: (i) social definition of the situation – (ii) social definition of behavioral rules (idea only recently rediscovered by contemporary behavioral economists). From the methodological standpoint, this implies that understanding coordination and cooperation is not possible without (i) considering full limits of individual rationality, and (ii) shared representations of reality and corresponding social/ethical judgments on people’s interaction.

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