ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The American Concept of Sovereignty and the Institutionalism of John R. Commons
Author: Vancura Matej
The proposed paper develops the question, what role is played in John R. Commons’ institutionalism by the analysis of sovereignty. Commons is clearly aware of the major differences that underlie the development of political institutions in Europe and in the United States and links these with two different conceptions of sovereignty. Nevertheless, this issue, which appears especially in an inter-continental comparative perspective, is usually not at the forefront of interpretations of Commons’ institutionalism. We will analyze the question of sovereignty in Commons not only as a theoretical issue that Commons deals with, but also as an essential characteristic of the object that he is studying. That is, the institutional system that he analyzes is an embodiment of a particular type of sovereignty. Whereas in European political systems, political power is vested primarily in the legislature and in the government, in the American political system, political power was, especially until Commons’ times, vested primarily in the judiciary, dominated by the Supreme Court and the Constitution. As Commons himself has observed, the major defining characteristic of Anglo-American political systems is that law traditionally derived its authority from custom and from the authority of the courts, not from the state. It is on the basis of these empirical realities that Commons formulates the assumption that law and custom are antecedent to state and that law originates through the decision of disputes. These specifically American observations are the decisive assumptions on which Commons establishes his theory of industrial and market regulation which he applies in an analysis and in proposals for reform of modern regulatory institutions: investigative and regulatory commissions, industrial self-organization based on collective bargaining and labor and factory legislation. The thesis that we propose in this paper is that the relationship of Commons to the American conception of sovereignty is complex. On the one hand, Commons accepts the common law foundation of law in the concepts of liberty and property and considers the common law method of making law by deciding disputes as a principle to be retained and expounded, on the other hand, he rejects the traditional contractarian and natural law connotations of American constitutionalism. The project of correlating law and economics that Commons undertakes is nothing less than an attempted reconstruction of the Constitutional theory on the basis of the new industrial realities. Commons will argue that we cannot retain the natural law meanings of property and liberty, instead, they must be replaced by “realist” and “relative” concepts of liberty and property that are to be subject to the criteria of “reasonability” and “fairness”.
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