ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Games judges don’t play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust (1975-2000)
Author: GIOCOLI Nicola
The history of the law and economics of predatory pricing is peculiar on account of the seemingly inescapable contradiction between the legal habit of condemning a business practice on account of its possible unfair and inefficient effects and the necessity of providing an economic rationale for the condemnation without undermining the essence of competition itself. The apparently rock-solid equation “low price = good price” makes such a rationale neither immediate nor easy to find – and predatory pricing such an interesting issue from the viewpoint of historians of economics. How to circumvent the equation has been the challenge for several of the most brilliant minds of postwar microeconomics, as well as for outstanding law scholars. It is a fascinating story, with deep implications for at least two major historiographic issues. First, the evolution of neoclassical economics, as embodied in one of its most important branches, industrial organization. Second, and strictly related to the conference’s main theme, the relationship between the formal results of theoretical economics and their concrete applicability: in short, what kind of economic argument may be accepted in legal practice? And, conversely, how and when did the practice of industrial economists manage to find hearing in courts? This paper is the second in a pair dedicated to this story. The first paper (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412808) covered the period from the 1950s to the early 1980s, that is to say, it stopped at the verge of the game-theoretic revolution in industrial organization and, above all, at the first implementations of the fundamental Areeda & Turner test for assessing predatory pricing. The present work will focus on the period 1975 – 2000, covering the above-mentioned revolution, its relationship with a couple of remarkable Supreme Court’s decisions and the evolution, in both the theory and the law, of the various tests of predation which stemmed from the Areeda & Turner one. Its main thesis is that the traditional dichotomy between alternative legal standards, those based on “stories” and those based on “rules”, provides the key for interpreting the evolution of economists’ and legal scholars’ thought about predatory pricing and, more generally, for explaining under what conditions a theoretical statement may have an effective policy impact, especially in courtrooms. What it turns out is that courts may well embrace, in different periods of time, either a rule-based or a story-based standard, but only conditionally on their conforming to the way legal arguments are usually advanced in courts. This explains why the most recent, and most sophisticated, stories of predatory pricing told by economists with the support of rigorous game-theoretic arguments have had an extremely hard time, and very little chances of, being welcomed by courts.
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