ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The history of central bank independence as a social construct and as an instrument
Author: Krampf Arie
Most studies about the history of central bank independence have assumed that central bank independence an index that measure the extent to which the central is capable to resist political pressures from the government and to maintain price stability. Such histories have recorded the fluctuations of the level of central bank independence across time and space and they explain the fluctuations on the basis of economic and/or political factors. In my research I employ methodologies of Science Studies to examine how the concept of central bank independence was constructed by experts, policy makers, politicians and central bankers. My aim is to show that the history of central bank independence was not only a change in the independence level of the central bank, but rather central bank independence meant different things in different times. In other words, the independency of the central bank fulfilled different roles in different local and international institutional settings. I argue that central bank independence should be studied as an instrument that can be used to different purposes in different institutional settings. My study compares the concept of central banking in three eras: the gold standard, the post-Second World War II era and the liberalization era. Moreover, I refer to the differences between central bank independence in industrial and developing countries. The research is based on examination of publications in academic journals and archival material.
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