ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Behavioural Economics, Game Theory and Das Adam Smith Problem
Author: WITZTUM Amos


This paper examines a rather peculiar development: Behavioural Economists hark back to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments to find an alternative for the modern rational utility maximiser which consistently fails to predict experimental results. They put their faith in Smith’s conception of the human character in which sympathy is equally relevant as self-interest. The problem is that main stream economics as manifested in general equilibrium and the rational utility maximiser also harks back to Smith. They, however, invoke the invisible hand metaphor to explain how the pursuit of one’s own interest is a sufficient base for competitive decentralisation to promote socially desirable outcomes. They, of course, find their routes in the Wealth of Nations. Inadvertently, the current debate at the heart of modern economics seems to re-ignite the famous Das Adam Smith Problem. The question at the heart of the battle between behavioural economics and the paradigmatic core of neo-classical economics is exactly the same question which was raised by the original Das Adam Smith Problem: are people self-interested or are they socially minded individuals who always employ ‘sympathy’ when dealing with others? The received answer to this question seems very much in line with the Behaviourists point of view: even self-interested people have other regarding capacity. But this raises a second Adam Smith Problem: if people are indeed socially minded even in their pursuit of their own interest, why was Smith so critical of the system of natural liberty? Behavioural economists use the social dimension of individuals’ rationality to show how the pitfalls of the prisoner’s dilemma can be averted. In so doing, they seem to uphold the paradigmatic core of modern economics which argues that competitive interactions would yield socially desirable allocations. This, to be sure, is very much in line with many of the solutions to Das Adam Smith problem where scholars argue that only in a world of ethical beings (socially minded) would the system of natural liberty work. But this raises a question about the kind of interaction which socially minded individuals would follow as opposed to self-interested ones. I will show that Adam Smith did indeed have a sophisticated theory of human behaviour but this does not mean that the idea of selfish behaviour is being ruled out. The problem with the approach of the behavioural economists is that if people are all equally socially minded then they may not engage in the kind of competition for which the Nash Equilibrium is a key concept. People with ethical principles would not obviously engage in ‘best response’ kind of interaction. Instead, they may be engaged in co-operative behaviour which, it must be made clear, is not the same as collusion and which may require different solution concepts than mere equilibrium. In the case of Adam Smith there are three elements to this problem: (a) the unity of human nature allows for a selfish type of socially minded individuals who would not behave very differently to the expectations of the rational utility maximiser; (b) there is an implicit evolutionary game with two very clear Evolutionary Stable Equilibria ; (c) the outcome of the evolutionary game dictates whether competitive behaviour and consequently, problems of the prisoner’s dilemma type, arise. The key parameter which influences the outcome in (b) is the Smithian concept of social distance.

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