ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: THE AGENT’S INTEREST IN THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMPETITION: WALRAS, EDGEWORTH, COURNOT.
Author: PIGNOL Claire


The polemical debate between Walras and Edgeworth on the competitive process, at the end of 19th century, has turned in the 20th century into the idea of a complementarity between both approaches, the edgeworthian recontracting (in Debreu-Scarf model) being understood as a rationale for the price-taking assumption of the walrasian model (Arrow-Debreu model) (Anderson 2008). While the debate between Walras and Edgeworth focused on the equilibrium process, modern theorists concentrated their attention to the existence of different types of equilibria. Recent works in history of economic thought (Negishi 1985, Rebeyrol 1999, Alvarez 2011, Donzelli 2011) proposed new lights on this quarrel, concentrating on the discussion of the information available in the process, and on the type of coalitions blocking allocations. The paper examines the debate in the light of a different question: the role of rationality in the determination of equilibrium. Is it true that the behaviour of edgeworthian agents can be deduced only from their rationality, while the price-taking behaviour of walrasian agents is not based on rationality? To answer this question, we will use not only the walrasian and edgeworthian conceptions of exchange, but also the cournotian one, since Cournot shares with Edgeworth both the refusal of price-taking assumption and the idea that the great number of agents is necessary to achieve a competitive equilibrium. We will then compare Negishi’s critic of Edgeworth (1985) and Bertrand’s critic of Cournot (1883) to make appear some implicit assumptions in edgeworthian and cournotian approaches on the role of demanders. It will be shown that none of the three approaches (walrasian, edgeworthian and cournotian) achieves to deduce the result of exchange from the sole rationality of agents: in each conception, rules of coordination are postulated, that cannot be deduced from rational behavior. Furthermore, Cournot does not provide a very efficient help to Edgeworth, even if he shares his ideas on the role of number of agents, since he does not postulate similar rules of coordination, in particular about the law of unique price. As a conclusion, the opposition between the walrasian and edgeworthian approaches concerns less the role of rationality than the determination, before the exchange process, of the rules that will be imposed to the agents in the process.

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