ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Justice as an Attribute of Individuals and Institutions
Author: Hurtado Jimena


As part of the proposed session on Justice (Ch. Le Chapelain, H. Igersheim, R. Ege and G. Vaggi) this paper will propose a comparative reading of Smith and Rousseau as thinkers who see justice as the building block of a shared community between individuals in the world, and the result of the construction of social values. Even if for both, justice is a social product for the former it emerges from the sympathetic process whereas for the latter it can be built as a mental exercise associated with the social contract. This difference would place each one of them as almost archetypical representatives of the traditions Sen presents. Through their analysis and study of human nature Smith and Rousseau advance their views for a society ruled by justice and freedom. Both present human beings who interact in a shared community capable of arriving at shared social values. However their paths diverge from the beginning: whereas Smith considers human nature is made of natural tendencies which combine themselves according to the prevailing incentives structure, Rousseau believes human nature is a historical and social product. This means that for the former society is the necessary consequence of natural sociability, inscribed in human nature, for the latter there is no such necessity. In our construction of the world with others, for Smith we form and are formed by the community we live in, and there is no sense in considering isolated individuals, while Rousseau admits the possibility of a failed society, there is no guarantee or certain path between the state of nature – in which the society of the pact is included- and the civil state or the society of the social contract. The result, for both, depends upon the recognition mechanisms they acknowledge. And this might seem somewhat paradoxical because in Smith sympathy means a game of mirrors where the other is perceived as a reflection and the process of observation, of exchanging looks between spectators, eventually needs no real spectator as the virtuous individual can live a solitary life, while in Rousseau the construction of society is the experience of the other as an experience of time, of our finitude and of the other as an external limit to our will, placing us in the world with others. Sympathy needs no real action whereas pity can only lead to sociability through the experience of common labor. This might explain why in Smith justice is a negative virtue that can be respected by doing nothing or abstaining from harming others, and for Rousseau it means an active compromise and participation in the political life of the community.

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