ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Agency, classical liberalism and the discovery of exchange, specialistion and property
Author: BROWN Vivienne


Agency, classical liberalism and the discovery of exchange, specialisation and property Vivienne Brown The Open University v.w.brown@open.ac.uk Submission for ESHET conference, 16-18 May 2013, Kingston University, UK In recent years there has been a huge experimental literature into the various ways that human behaviour seems to be other-regarding or otherwise motivated by social norms or moral considerations, and classic liberal writers such as Adam Smith and David Hume are frequently cited in support of this more rounded view of human behaviour. This literature is a challenge to the caricature of ‘homo economicus’ or atomistic individualism according to which human action is always or preponderantly self-interested, but there is still a debate as to how this behaviour should be theorised. For example, cooperation and coordination seem to be facilitated by social norms, but such cooperative behaviour can be accommodated within standard (including behavioural) game theory by the argument that such behaviour can be rational (i.e. payoff-maximising) if payoffs include other-regarding factors as well as self-regarding ones. Vernon L. Smith provides a fascinating summary of his experimental results in ‘Exchange, Specialisation, and Property as a Discovery Process’, HOPE (2011), where he argues that the discovery of exchange, specialisation and property is motivated by moral factors, and cites Adam Smith and David Hume in support of this contention. In this paper I question whether the evidence, both experimental and textual, as cited by Vernon Smith does support the argument that moral factors explain the discovery of exchange, specialisation and property in his reported experiments. In this paper I argue that there is another possible explanation, one that involves a different conception of agency. This conception of agency is what I have elsewhere termed an ‘intersubjective’ conception of agency such that individual agents reason in terms of ‘each of us’. Such agents are social agents in that they understand the mutuality of the situation they share with others, although they still aim to maximise individual payoffs. Intersubjectivity itself thus does not presuppose morality although it can be highly conducive to it. It can therefore challenge the standard view by showing how cooperation can be compatible with individual maximisation even in the absence of other-regarding motivation. I raise the question whether this more social conception of individuality is more true to the classic liberal tradition, that is, here Adam Smith and David Hume, than the standard accounts of atomistic individualism.

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