ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: The figure of the judge in Coase’s economics
Author: Bertrand Elodie


The aim of this paper is to examine the figure of the judge in Ronald Coase’s analysis of harmful effects (externalities). “The problem of social cost” (Coase 1960) famously brought to light the influence of the property rights allocation on the economic result. One of its normative implications is for the judge to take into account this economic influence of his/her decision when allocating property rights. Coase couples this normative role of judges to an empirical claim that judges do actually take into account this influence. This communication will argue that the figure of the judge, in Coase’s economics, seems to avoid all the criticisms this author addressed to regulators. These regulators lack information and are vulnerable to political pressures; they are human beings who are fallible and pursue their own interests. The difference of treatment between the judge and other public agents is most visible in Coase’s implicit claim that common law is more efficient than statutory law. The judge therefore escapes from his views of governmental regulation and of human nature, which has to be explained. I conclude that a judge maximising the value of production is theoretically necessary to complete Coase’s economic theory, but this figure does not fit with the overall structure (the view of human nature and governmental intervention) that first rendered it necessary.

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