ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: From Constant and Berlin to social choice theory. Appealing to past ideas to renew modern economics
Author: Igersheim Herrade


Abstract. The aim of this paper is to appeal to two classic pairs of freedom (i.e. freedom of the moderns/freedom of the ancients and negative freedom/positive freedom) in order to propose new solutions for two famous impossibility results developed in the social-choice-theoretical framework (Sen's liberal paradox, 1970 and Gibbard's impossibility result, 1974). As stressed by Giocoli (2013), economists should be interested in history of economic thought for both normative and positive reasons. While the normative reasons lead to a 'science studies' perspective, the positive reasons plead in favor of a 'retrospective' approach since it amounts to bringing into light the potential for today of historic analyses. Therefore, the methodological approach of this article is in line with a retrospective approach since we attempt to appeal to past theories to improve contemporary theories. Here, our questioning is about the re-emergence of freedom in modern economic theory, especially in welfare economics. Indeed, one cannot fail to notice, observing the mainstream research in this domain in the last four decades, the reappearance of freedom. Before the end of the nineteenth century, the use by economists of freedom as a normative criterion to evaluate social states was common. But, from there on to very recently, freedom as such has virtually disappeared from the conceptual framework of economists. For some authors, such as Sen (1970) and Rawls (1971), freedom seems to become again an essential criterion for appraising the states of affairs. In 1970, Sen introduces the concept of individual rights and liberties in the theory of social choice largely defined by Arrow (1951). The paradox of the Paretian liberal illustrated by the now classical example of Lady Chatterley’s Lover is the starting point of practically all the debates on the definition of individual rights. The subsequent result obtained by Gibbard (1974) relative to the internal inconsistency of rights also contributes to the new focus on this issue. Many authors such as Nozick (1974) think that Arrow's framework used by Sen is not compatible with individual rights and freedom, while Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura (1992) prefer to frame their formalisation into the game-theoretical approach. In this paper, we claim that the social-choice-theoretical framework can be preserved if one re-considers it in the light of two classic pairs of freedom: the pair freedom of the moderns/freedom of the ancients developed by Constant (1819) and the pair negative freedom/positive freedom elaborated by Berlin (1969). In other words, our aim is to introduce the conceptual meaning of both pairs of freedom in the social-choice-theoretical framework in order to bring about new solutions to Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility results. These solutions are notably based on the concept of metaranking developed by Sen (1974, 1977; on this issue, see as well Igersheim, 2007 and Ege and Igersheim, 2011). References Arrow K. J., (1951), Social choice and individual values, 1st ed., New York, Wiley. Berlin I., (1969), Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Constant B., (1819), De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes, in B. Constant, Oeuvres politiques, Paris, Louandre C. (éd.), 1874, pp. 258-286. Ege R. and Igersheim H. (eds.), (2011), Freedom and Happiness in Economic Thought and Philosophy: From Clash to Reconciliation, London, Routledge, 302 p. Gaertner W., P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, (1992), Individual rights revisited, Economica, 59, pp. 161-177. Gibbard A., (1974), A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim, Journal of Economic Theory, 7, pp. 388-410. Giocoli N., (2013), Crossed Destinies: Law and Economics Meets the History of Economic Thought, History of Economic Ideas, forthcoming. Igersheim H., (2007), Du paradoxe libéral-parétien à un concept de métaclassement des préférences, Recherches Economiques de Louvain/Louvain Economic Review, 73, pp. 173-192. Nozick R., (1974), Anarchy, state and utopia, Oxford, Blackwell. Rawls J., (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press. Sen A. K., (1970), Collective choice and social welfare, San Francisco, Holden-Day. Sen A. K., (1974), Choice, orderings and morality, in S. Körner (ed.), Practical reason, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 54-67. Sen A. K., (1977), Rational fools : critique of the behavioural foundations of economic theory, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, pp. 317-344.

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