ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Two Concepts of Decision
Author: Johannes Rolf, Kesting Peter
Rolf Johannes/Peter Kesting Two Concepts of Decision Decision Theory is the core and starting point of modern economics. Be it in microeconomics (cf. p. ex. Mas-Collel et al. 1995) or in Collective and Public Choice theories (cf. p. ex. Arrow 1952 or Buchanan/Tullock 1962) — the assumptions for modeling individual choice behaviour in a market situation are more or less the same as those for handling decision processes in collective bodies such as firms, organisations or nation states. The concept of decision in economics claims to cover all possible decision problems irrespective of their significance for the decision maker or the domain of human agency in question. Whereever individuals or collective agents define alternative future states of the world that differ in their preference-ranking, they tend to choose actions leading to the higher-ranking alternative. What motivates decison makers to choose one particular action from a set of alternatives? The answer to this question given by standard decision theory is simple: Reconciling their desires and objectives with available information and probabilities, decision makers give preference to the expected results of their choice, they are pulled towards one particular state of the world rather than to its alternative. In other words, the concept of decision in economics is essentially teleological (cf. p. ex. Robbins 1932, v. Mises 1940 or O’Sullivan 1987). After World War I the German legal scholar and political theorist Carl Schmitt developed a concept of decision competing — avant la lettre — with the teleological concept in economics (cf. Schmitt 1922 and 1927). According to what he called „decisionism“ there are political situations that push towards decision-taking. If a deliberative or electoral process fails to lead to a consensus regarding the norm to be followed, someone who proves to be the sovereign must decide on the exception. In a state of exception it is no longer possible to follow a norm, it must be decided on the norm to be followed. For the decisionist — in contrast to the economist — it is imperative that a decision be taken at all rather than weighing its content. In decisionism the motive for decision-making is the need to settle an ambiguous situation. A decision „in the true sense of the word“ is thus not motivated by a preference for a certain legal norm, but by the impending threat of turmoil and violence should no decision between alternative norms be taken. In other words, the concept of decision in decisionism is an essentially causal one. The teleological concept of decision seems to be incompatible with the causal one. However, a closer look reveals that no decision process is conceivable which fails to combine both elements. Without the causal push towards settling a situation or the pressure, be it of needs, urges or the individual conscience, on the one hand, and the teleological pull towards a preferred state of the world on the other, no decision would ever be taken. This paper attempts to evaluate the properties of both decision motives which can formally be treated in an identical fashion. This may open the way to a more dynamic concept of decision. What are the benefits of this approach? If we subscribe to the economic concept of decision we are rendered a biased view of the world. In the domain of political economy this view underestimates the significance of the public domain. In the domain of political philosophy this view supports the so-called „negative“ as compared to the „positive“ concept of freedom. A more dynamic concept of decision making may mediate between these positions and their political consequences. References Buchanan, James M./Tullock, Gordon (1962) The Calculus of Consent, in: Buchanan, James M. (1999) The Collected works of James M. Buchanan, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Mas-Colell, Andreu; Whinston, Michael D.; Green, Jerry R. (1995) Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: OUP. Mises, Ludwig v. (1940) Nationalökonomie, Genf: Editions Union; first English edition (1949) Human Action, Yale: YUP. O’Sullivan, Patrick J. (1987) Economic Methodology and Freedom to Choose, London: Allen & Unwin. Robbins, Lionel (1932) An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, London: Macmillan. Schmitt, Carl (1922) Politische Theologie, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; first English edition (1985) Political Theology, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. Schmitt, Carl (1927) Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; first English edition (1976) The Concept of the Political, New Brunswick, NJ.
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