ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Governing the Commons. A historical perspective
Author: Costanza Sofia, Masini Fabio
While the literature on public goods acquired a robust academic status very early in the history of economics (from Marshall to Samuelson, from the Italian to the Swedish early writings on public finance), the reflection on collective goods shows a more complex trajectory. The “commons”, as goods whose stakeholders form a different community from the national or subnational administrations, were studied already in pre-classical economics as a matter of juridical questions on property rights and continued to fuel debates in the Nineteenth-Century-England along similar lines. Only after Olson (1964) and Hardin (1968), collective goods become the focus of specific academic debates both in political science (Russett and Sullivan 1971; Ruggie 1972; Chamberlin 1974; Frohlich et al. 1975), and economics (Mishan 1969; Owen 1969; Olson 1971; Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Epple and Zelenitz 1981; Stern, Dietz and Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 2010). One of the crucial features highlighted in such literature is the difficulty of decision-making in collective actions, i.e. in context where the community of stakeholders related to a particular good or service does not coincide with the usual political constituencies and where therefore a democratic voting and representative system is not available for the specific collective choice (both at sub-national and supra-national level) and is not enforceable through juridical norms. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to reconstruct the main steps of the literature concerning collective goods. The second is to highlight, in those debates, the key features concerning shortcomings of - and solutions to - the governance of collective goods. The paper is structured as follows. The first section reviews the literature on the emergence of the problem of governing the commons. The second section enquires into the more recent evolution of the topic. The third illustrates two opposing approaches to the solution of collective action problems, highlighting their flaws. The final section concludes.
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