ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Daniel Ellsberg and the validation of normative propositions
Author: Zappia Carlo
In the history of decision theory Daniel Ellsberg is known because, in his seminal paper “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms”, he formulated the counterexample to Bayesian decision-making that got the normative value of the theory into trouble. But he was able to contribute neither to empirical investigation nor to the foundation of a new normative theory, initially because of his involvement with the military and later because of his active role in trying to put an end to the Vietnam war. As a result, although Ellsberg’s 1961 article originated a huge experimental literature on decision-making under uncertainty, its philosophical background remains largely unknown. An assessment of Ellsberg’s contribution in the more encompassing framework of his long unnoticed 1962 doctoral thesis suggests, instead, that – following in a tradition of thinkers that were critical of the maximisation of “moral expectations” and expected utility – Ellsberg provided a thorough philosophical and methodological background for his critique of Savage’s axiomatization of decision theory. By concentrating mainly on Ellsberg’s all-encompassing analysis of decision-making in his thesis, the paper shows that a number of relevant issues connected to the paradox can be thrown light on. More in particular, the paper examines the way Ellsberg conceived the possibility to test normative propositions and tries to identify the kind of normative value he attributed to his own suggested solution for the paradox. Ellsberg shows how Savage’s procedure of eliciting probabilities from choices makes it possible to identify those choices not conforming to the theory, and thus provides normative decision theory of empirical content, in so much as it rules out certain patterns of choices. Empirical investigation creates the possibility of questioning a theory when the decision-maker wishes to persist in her violation of the “maxims” of behaviour after thorough deliberation. So the identification of a clear-cut counterexample is not simply intended to show a descriptive anomaly, but is instrumental to a discussion of the normative value of the theory. Ellsberg’s suggestion is that the normative descriptive divide is less clear-cut than usually assumed. While it is true that the consistency of a certain set of axioms is a logical, normative problem, and not a psychological, descriptive one – as first argued by Marschak in his presentation of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s utility axioms – the degree of acceptance and authority of certain maxims of behaviour must have a descriptive component nonetheless. A “system of logic” which satisfies logical consistency but does not apply to the deliberate decisions of a decision-maker may induce the decision-maker to find more rational to satisfy his preferences and “let the axioms satisfy themselves.” Ellsberg does not refer to falsifiability, but the methodological argument he proposes follows a typically falsificationist approach, with the aim to reject Savage’s theory and to provide heuristic advice about how to develop a new normative theory, arguably less likely to be confronted with deliberate violation when tested. The paper shows that Ellsberg’s application of falsification is not naïve, since he is aware that a counterexample provides a necessary condition for the falsification of a normative theory, but that this is not a sufficient condition to reject a theory. Ellsberg’s conjecture about the origins of the anomaly is intended to offer a sketch of a new normative theory capable to account for the anomaly.
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