ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: “POSITIONAL VIEWS” AS THE CORNERSTONE OF SEN’S IDEA OF JUSTICE
Author: Baujard Antoinette, Gilardone Muriel
The ethical content of public action may be questioned: if the only receivable views are agents’, how could it be objectively shown that one public action is better than another one? Can an objective aim be at all meaningful at the collective level as far as each agent’s view is positional, hence partial? While the new economic theories of justice work with value judgments that are justified externally, Sen propose an original contribution to the idea of justice by raising the issue of objectivity. Unfortunately Sen is poorly understood. According to a consensual observation in the special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2012, vol. 19, n°2) on Amartya Sen’s The idea of justice (2009), Sen’s theory needs further clarification and articulation.It is standard to assimilate Sen to capabilities and complain about their lack of operationality, but we have been able to show that « Sen is not a capability theorist » after he recalled it himself(Baujard&Gilardone 2015). This gap between his intention and the perception of his contribution calls for an explanation of his constructive contribution. Even then, certain comments consider that objectivity and public reasoning are just complementary to Sen’s capability approach (Davis 2012, Bonvin 2005, Qizilbash 2007). And many merely disconsider their importance insofar as they do not refer to Sen’s objectivity and public reasoning when commenting Sen’s contribution. Rather than thinking in the framework of formal welfarism standard in social choice theory and economic theories of justice, we suggest taking seriously Sen’s specific notion of objectivity, and try to reconstruct his theory from there. This paper defends that, as soon as we focus on the idea of public reasoning rather than capability,the cornerstone of Sen’s contribution to theories of justice may be found in his concept of “positional views”. Firstly, we highlightthe dramatic distinction of positional views with preferences, notably because the formerare primarily linked to“objectivity”. Positional views may be objectivized and thus be used as an informational basis to think about justice. Secondly, we argue thatSen’s conception of objectivity takes into account information and sentiments relative to a position, and we describetheir evolution towards more transpositional views. We claim that Sen’s idea of public reasoning, with at its core positional views, is more respectful of individual agency than would be, for instance, a capability theory. More generally, it distinguishes sharply from any transcendental theories, where agents are not given any leading role. In Sen’s comparative approach, agents are assigned the responsibility of designing and implementing justice.
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