ABSTRACT OF PAPER

Title: Democracy, equality and central bank independence – what do the reformers think 17 years on?
Author: Lönnroth Johan


One argument for the Swedish central bank (Riksbank) independence reform of 1998 was that it was a way to prevent policy-makers from being tempted to use monetary policy – especially before elections – in an opportunistic and, in the long run, distortionary way. Another argument was that a reform of this sort was necessary because of Sweden’s membership (since 1995) of the EU. One argument against the reform was the need for coordination of fiscal and monetary policies; another was the insufficient democratic anchoring of the supposedly apolitical central bankers, who would have to take not only inflation but also employment and financial stability into consideration, so influencing both labour market relations and income distribution. In this paper, I attempt to evaluate the current thinking of the leading actors in the reform. The first part of the paper starts by describing the historical background of the reform as at the end of WWII and then reviews what has happened between then and now (April 2016). In Part II, I present the result of interviews and email conversations with the key figures of the reform process, including the then acting Prime Minister, the Minister for Finance, the Chairman of the Riksbank Council and the four most recent Governors of the Riksbank. The questions I asked were (in summary form): 1. What were your main arguments for or against the reform? 2. What is your assessment of the results of the reform today? 3. Is there a need to make changes to the Riksbank’s position and/or to other institutional arrangements for fiscal and monetary policy in Sweden? If so, how? 4. What are your views on Sweden’s decision not to commit to EMU and the need to reform the institutional arrangements for EU and EMU fiscal and monetary policies? The answers varied of course, but, in short, the responses were as follows: 1. Twelve of the 16 interviewees were clearly in favour of the reform. Four of them were more doubtful. EU membership was the most important factor; the inability to bring down inflation in the 1970s and 1980s was the second most important. Economic theory played only a minor role, and was certainly less important than leading Swedish economists believe. 2. On the whole the outcomes were positive. However, monetary policy was too contractionary between 2008 and 2014, and politicians were not sufficiently involved in the control and evaluation of monetary policy. 3. Major new reform is not necessary, but there should be clarification of the relationship between inflation targeting, employment and financial stability as goals for monetary policy and of the Riksbank’s relationship with other economic policy actors. 4. Sweden should not adopt the euro within the foreseeable future. There is a need for more coordination of EU and EMU fiscal policies. In conclusion, I attempt to answer the four questions myself.

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