ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The paternalism charge in historical perspective. The case of Musgrave’s public household
Author: Desmarais-Tremblay Maxime
The last decade has seen a surge of interest for new public policies based on behavioural evidence. Thaler and Sunstein’s claim to identify paternalistic, yet libertarian policies as given rise to a new wave of debate around the legitimate interventions of the state with respect to individual choices. This kind of internal dispute has a long history within the liberal tradition. Another instance of it occurred in the second half of the twentieth century around the concept of merit goods. The paternalistic nature of the specific expenditures labelled and defended by Richard A. Musgrave (1959) was one of the explicit reasons for the rejection of the concept by many public finance scholars in the 1960s. In this paper, I would like to make sense of the paternalism charge by showing that it is intrinsic to the way Musgrave conceptualises the state as a public household. Since the public economy is thought of in terms of a metaphor with the domestic or private household, it will necessarily conflict with proper political values of individual freedom and autonomy. Arendt (1958) argued that political economy was a contradiction in terms. She showed how the discipline’s emergence was concomitant with that of the social realm, modelled on the domestic sphere, not on the political life. The household focus of the Greek œconomia, just as the strongly paternalistic conceptualisations of Steuart and Rousseau are well known. Myrdal ([1930] 1953) has already shown how many concepts of political economy are remnants of a household point of view with a conscious and purposeful direction. This is notable in the German lexicon (Wirthschaft, Volkswirtschaft,) as Tribe (2015) has illustrated. Surely, the nineteenth century saw the triumph of the cosmopolitan perspective and political economy developed more along the search for natural laws of market exchange. Yet, things look different if one focuses on public finance. The German Cameralist tradition might have already faded by the end of the eighteenth century, but its mode of thinking about the state passed on in Finanzwissenschaft. In the early twentieth century, the productive capacity of the state (Erwerben) became a central dimension of the theorisation efforts, but many authors still centred their conceptualisation of the state around the idea of planning, or budgeting (Haushalten) for needs satisfaction. The family metaphor is striking in many respects. The state is conceived (i) as oriented to a purpose, that of wants satisfaction and more generally the welfare of a community; (ii) it is hierarchically organised with a central direction; (iii) the members of the community are often assumed to follow altruistic of communal motivations towards each other; (iii) many transfers of resources (taxes, or expenditures) are done in-kind. Musgrave’s model of the rational Public Household (1937, 1959) (inherited from Wagner’s Staatshaushalt) embodies these principles to a large extent. Furthermore, two historical phenomena reinforce the metaphor. First, Wagner’s Law stipulates that the civilised states gradually took over responsibilities for the welfare of their citizens. In practice, this meant a transfer of responsibilities from the private households to the public. Second, the experience of a command economy during WWII empowered the economists and made central allocation of resources a feasible reality. This might not have been a problem for Musgrave, would it not be for the new methodological imperative of reducing the conceptualisation of the state activity in terms of individual demands. In the United States in the 1950s it had become unacceptable to defend a social welfare point of view not based on methodological individualism. The concept of merit goods embodies this tension between Musgrave’s desire to build a theory for a (individualistic) democratic society, yet one based on a household perspective. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of modern public economics, by analysing the conceptual legacy it inherited. It also sheds historical light on the problem of paternalism in political economy.
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