ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Equality at the heart of the debate
Author: TARRIT Fabien
John Rawls’s introduction of the issue of equality in political philosophy is based on welfare economics, and concerns itself with an objective of equity, which cannot be found in an utilitarian approach. As a standard for equity, Rawls has chosen primary goods, which he sees as having the best correspondence to what a good life is. They also avoid some of the difficulties of utilitarianism. A difficulty arises whenever there is some conflict between equality and alternative values that are intrinsically non-egalitarian. For Rawls, justice should appear – and be applied – at three levels: (i) the regularity and the application of rules, (ii) the issue of basic rights and (iii) the equality of rights. As a result, every individual or every human group can be considered as a moral subject and, as such, is entitled to equal justice. Undeniably, such an approach needs a more precise interpretation of the issues which are at stake in the debate on the scope of equality. As a matter of fact, equality appears to be at the core of the debate and it will be further discussed here. Rawls proposes well-being as a standard, which is measured as we saw, with a bundle of primary goods, but critiques rapidly appeared on the nature of what should be equalized, aswell-being and primary goods are not necessarily the best measures of equality. A discussion followed on the nature of the standard for equality: what it is that should be equalized in order to achieve a fair theory of justice (1)? Alternatives to primary goods were proposed, namely resources (Dworkin), which are supposed to integrate individual responsibility, and capabilities (Sen), which relate to what the effects are of the goods on person (2). Another kind of critique focuses not on the substance of the theory but on the method. While Dworkin and Sen accept the essential tenets of the theory and discuss how it could be implemented, Cohen proposes that the difficulties in Rawls’s theory are based on the fact that its central devices are not solid enough to offer a high quality theory. Both the basic structure and the difference principle are criticized (3).
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