ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: ‘Reason within’, ‘Reason without’ and Virtue Return on Smith in the light of Kant and Foucault
Author: Ege Ragip, Igersheim Herrade
The purpose of this paper is to interrogate the interactions between two kinds of reason, the ‘reason within’ and the ‘reason without’, as well as their links with the notion of virtue. The distinction between the ‘reason within’ and the ‘reason without’ is reflected both in Adam Smith’s distinction between the “man within” and the “man without” (Smith, 1759, III, ii, 32, p. 150) and in Amartya Sen’s very recent proposal that there is a dichotomy between the transcendental and comparative approaches to justice (Sen, 2009). First, our paper aims to show that this supposed mutual exclusivity between the transcendental and the comparative approaches can be overcome through a reinterpretation of these two approaches by means of the paired concepts ‘reason within’ and ‘reason without’. Such a reinterpretation would thus allow a reconciliation of those two traditions. To do so, we claim that the concept of ‘reason within’ harbors a transcendental feature; this is what Kant – most likely after reading Smith’s work – calls the “impartial reasonable spectator” (vernünftiger unparteiischer Zuschauer) (Kant, 1785, p. 7). One can characterize the ‘reason within’ as the condition which enables the moral subject to become open to the rest of the world and thus to the points of view of other moral subjects. On the other hand, we emphasize the similarity between the concept of ‘reason without’ and Sen’s comparative approach. Indeed, the mere fact that the existence of a condition renders something possible does not mean that the condition is thereby effective in itself; and in the present context we note that subjects will tend to run away from the impartial spectator’s stare and take refuge in the security and moral comfort of their “natural station”. In other words, the ‘reason within’ remains so to speak asleep inside the individual. This is why a ‘reason without’ must irrupt in our world in order to stimulate, awaken, and reactivate our ‘reason within’. Sen’s comparative approach focuses precisely on how the so-called ‘reason without’, i.e. Smith’s real spectator, intervenes in the world of moral subjects and reveals certain unknown human realities to them. Sen says: “Smith invoked the reflective device of the impartial spectator to go beyond reasoning that may – perhaps imperceptibly – be constrained by local conventions of thought, and to examine deliberately, as a procedure, what the accepted conventions would look like from the perspective of a ‘spectator’ at a distance” (Sen, 2009, p.125). According to Sen, the interventions of the Smithian real spectator allow moral subjects to make progress in the comparison of social states when the question of social justice is at stake. In a second time, we will focus on the links between the interactions of the ‘reason within’ and the ‘reason without’ and the concept of virtue. In the most powerful and profound moments of his enquiry Smith analyses the question of virtue not as a given quality (“prudence” being the highest among other qualities), but as desire, love or will of virtue. In these moments the question of virtue is necessarily connected to the concept of “impartial spectator”, as in the following passage: “The prudent man is always both supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of the impartial spectator, and of the representative of the impartial spectator, the man within the breast” (Smith, 1759, I, 1, 12). As love, desire or will, the question of virtue refers to the ability of moral subject to distance from himself, in other words the ability to take himself as a workobject, as a transformable material ad infinitum. As stressed above, the individual can open himself to the reality of the other, and can reach a position of impartiality regarding his “natural station” in so far as the other awakens the impartial spectator within the individual. The ‘reason without’ must encourage and invite the individual to make use of his ‘reason within’. In this sense, the “love of virtue” (Smith, 1759, VII, 2, iv, 8) appears as a concept remarkably close to Foucault’s concept of “work of us on ourselves” (“le travail de nous-mêmes sur nous-mêmes”). Through such an exercise the aim of the moral subject is not reduced merely to the search of immediate praise and honours but to be “praiseworthy”: “The man of the greatest magnanimity, who desires virtue for its own sake, and is most indifferent about what actually are the opinions of mankind with regard to him, is still, however, delighted with the thoughts of what they should be, with the consciousness that though he may neither be honoured nor applauded, he is still the proper object of honour and applause” (Smith, 1759, VII, 2, iv, 10). The second part of our inquiry focuses on this singular work of virtuous man on himself, a work Kant would describe as an “infinite task”. References Kant, I., (1785). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1974. Sen, A. K., (2009), The Idea of Justice, Harvard University Press. Smith, A. (1759), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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