ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The birth of tradable permits systems
Author: BERTA Nathalie, HOUETO Jean-Daniel
The concept of externality – and the way externalities can be internalized – have received a growing attention in the field of history of economic thought during the last decade (see e.g., Bertrand 2010, Medema 2011, Marciano 2013, Berta 2015). But very few contributions are devoted to the history of markets of permits – or tradable permits systems – as a particular internalization mode. This article aims to study the rise of such an idea in the 1960s: how emerges this solution – which was, at the beginning, considered a kind of “academic curiosity” (Tietenberg 2010) but which became, in the 1980s, one of the most traditional internalization modes. Two internalization modes guaranty, from a theoretical point of view, the achievement of Pareto optimality: a Pigovian tax or a ‘market’ for externalities (‘market’ referring here either to a Coasean negotiation or to an Arrovian market, see e.g., Berta and Bertrand 2014 for the distinction). Although being relevant from a theoretical or ideal point of view, these solutions – designed to restore Pareto optimality – stumble on well-known practical difficulties. Indeed, their implementation would require e.g., the knowledge of the agents’ marginal damage functions (for the Pigovian tax), a perfect competition framework (for Arrovian markets) or a world of zero transaction costs (for the Coasean solution). For the practical achievement of Pareto optimality, of such first-best solutions, is obviously impossible, a new and weaker criterion of efficiency is set in the 1960s: achieving given environmental standards, that is levels of externalities that are not Pareto optimal, at least cost. The tradable permits markets guaranty this kind of efficiency, i.e. the minimization of the social abatement cost that reaching these standards would induce. The objective of this paper is twofold. It aims to focus on those who first carried this environmental policy instrument (Crocker 1966, Dales 1968a, 1968b) and to contextualize their contributions. Next, it aims to study the authors who, nearly at the same time but quite independently, contributed to formally address the efficiency issue of this kind of instrument (e.g., Baumol and Oates 1971 and Montgomery 1972). While Crocker and Dales brought the idea, they did not provide any theoretical foundation, the latter been developed by authors, like Montgomery, who were belonging to the general equilibrium tradition.
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