ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: Triffin Dilemma and Regional Monetary Approach: a Reappraisal
Author: Pierre-Hernan Rojas
In the second half of the 20th century, Robert Triffin was the first to formalize that, under the gold exchange standard, the key currency issuing country faced a dilemma. Either the United States would stop providing more dollar balances for international finance. In that case, trade would stagnate and there would be a deflationary bias in the global economy. Either the United States would continue to provide more of the international reserve currency, leading ultimately to a loss of confidence in the dollar, as US obligations to redeem foreign holdings with gold would be seen to be unsustainable. Foreshadowing the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, Triffin was involved in European monetary integration to enable European countries to cope with instability generated by floating exchange rates. Nevertheless, it could be wrong to consider that Triffin saw regional monetary integration as an alternative to the reform of the international monetary system. On the contrary, from the outset in the 1940s, Triffin considered regional monetary cooperation and integration as complementary to a reform of the international monetary system. The reconstruction of Triffin’s thinking provides another understanding of the formulation of the dilemma. In the 1940s, first at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and then at the International Monetary Fund, Triffin began to study international monetary economics and support the regional monetary integration at a moment when the Bretton Woods system was unable to restore multilateralization and currencies convertibility. In the first section, we analyze Triffin’s view on the necessity to provide liquidity in a managed international monetary system. According to him, the orthodox gold standard theory did not provide a consistent explanation of the external adjustment mechanism, leading to fallacies in the conduct of national economic policies. In the second section of the paper, we show that this provision of international liquidity was not ensured by the Bretton Woods architecture setting up after the World War 2. To avoid one side of the dilemma in time of dollar scarcity, Triffin advocated the establishment of a clearing structure for the European countries in 1946-1947 that will give rise to the European Payments Union in 1950. Based on this previous observation, the third section of the paper reappraises the origin of the dilemma formulation by Triffin in his willingness to make the international monetary system more symmetrical in its operation, based on cooperation at the regional level.
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